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JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF LETTERS OF CREDIT LAW:
A REAPPRAISAL
The unique nature of letters of credit1 and the need for
commercial flexibility 2 they serve have traditionally deterred legis-
lators from over-structuring the laws that control their use. 3 Ab-
sent legislative guidance, 4 courts have exercised great discretion in
reconciling customs,5 statutes, 6 and relevant principles of contract
and surety law 7 to resolve letter of credit disputes. 8  However,
A letter of credit is a commitment undertaken by a bank or other entity (the "is-
suer") issued in accordance with instructions from and for the account of the applicant (the
"customer") in favor of a third party (the "beneficiary'). The commitment obligates the
issuer for a specific time period to make payments to or to pay drafts drawn by the ben-
eficiary upon the presentation of stipulated documents, provided the beneficiary has
complied with the letter of credit's terms and conditions.
Formal definitions vary. See, e.g., B. KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN
THE AMERICAS 9, 599 (1966). Recent literature explores definitional aspects and the various
types of letters of credit. See generally Arnold & Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit -The
Controversy Continues, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 272, 272-81 (1978); Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations
and Frustrations-Part I, 94 BANKING L.J. 424, 425-30 (1977); Verkuil, Bank Solvency and
Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REV. 716, 717-21 (1973); Comment, Letters of Credit:
Current Theories and Usages, 39 LA. L. REV. 581, 582-87 (1979).
2 H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND,ACcEPTANCES 16-19 (5th ed. 1974).
n Letters of credit have long been used in international sales transactions. See, e.g., J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
704 (2d ed. 1980); Comment, Commercial Letters of Credit: Development and Expanded Use of
Modern Commercial Transactions, 4 CUN.-SAM. L. REV. 134, 145-51 (1973). The rapid growth
of diverse letter of credit uses within this country, however, has been a more recent
phenomenon. See, e.g., Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.
L.J. 251 (1972). This Note focuses on the problems of their use within the United States.
' See notes 27-30 and accompanying text infra.
Custom has exerted a strong impact on the long-term development of commercial
letters of credit. See B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, at 75-97. For an historical survey, see
generally id. at 3-19; H. GUTTERIDGE & M. MEGRAH, THE LAW OF BANKERS' COMMERCIAL
CREDITS (4th ed. 1968); Comment, supra note 3, at 134, 135-40.
6 The basic legal principles governing letters of credit are codified in Article Five of
the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ("UCC") and in the UNIFORM CUSTONIS AND PRACTICES FOR
CO'MMERCIAL DOCUMENTARY CREDITS FIXED BY THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1974 rev.) ("UCP").
Contract principles are relevant to many aspects of letter of credit transactions,
such as the obligations between customer and beneficiary and between customer and is-
suer. Although the letter of credit relationship itself (between issuer and beneficiary) is not
exclusively contractual (see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 711), many contract
principles apply by analogy in defining duties and resolving, for example, ambiguities in a
written letter of credit agreement. See note 64 and accompanying text infra. Courts apply
surety principles to differentiate letters of credit issued by national banks from traditional
guarantees. See notes 66, 69, and accompanying text infra. See generally Comment, supra
note 1, at 588-92.
8 Courts receive guidance from regulatory agencies as well as legislatures. For exam-
ple, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB),
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the recent increase in domestic use of letters of credit,!' and their
more diverse applications,10 have exacerbated the problems courts
encounter in adjudicating letter of credit claims and have left
the courts with increased responsibility for developing fundamen-
tal letter of credit principles.
Expansive judicial power in developing letter of credit law has
produced two adverse effects. First, legislative inaction has forced
courts to assume an inappropriate policymaking role.11 Second,
judicial reliance on equitable principles to resolve disputes has
prevented development of consistent letter of credit law. This
threatens to undermine the stability and predictability letters of
credit otherwise provide for the parties that use them.1 2
This Note examines areas of letter of credit law in which
broad judicial discretion has compromised fundamental letter of
credit principles. It concludes by suggesting that only legislative
guidance will enable the courts to preserve the advantages that
letters of credit offer in commercial transactions.
and the Comptroller of the Currency regulate issuances of letters of credit by national
banks. Recently, each agency has responded to concerns about the dangers of unregulated
bank issuances of standbys by issuing regulations establishing guidelines and requirements.
See note 72 and accompanying text infra.
See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 752. The most rapid increase in domes-
tic use has occurred with standby letters of credit. National banks, for example, had less
than $1.5 billion worth of standby credits outstanding in 1973. By 1978, the value of out-
standing standbys had increased to over $10 billion. Second Meeting on the Condition of the
Banking System: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1978). In the absence of legislative restrictions, this trend appears
likely to continue.
o The increased use of standby credits has accounted for much of the increasing ver-
satility of letters of credit. See note 9 supra. Standby credits have been used, inter alia, as
collateral security for loans, as a substitute for performance and libel bonds, to guarantee
payments of salaries, for interim financing, as a security device for repurchase agreements,
to finance real estate transactions, and to finance the issuance of commercial paper. For
discussion of the varied uses of standby credits, see Joseph, Letters of Credit: The Developing
Concepts and Financing Functions, 94 BANKING L.J. 816 (1977); Verkuil, supra note 1, at
721-24; Note, Guaranty Letters of Credit: Problems and Possibilities, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 822,
825-29 (1974).
"1 Where letter of credit principles are familiar and accepted, considerable judicial dis-
cretion in resolving disputes is appropriate. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text infra.
Where letter of credit policies are uncertain and in seeming conflict with other established
legal principles, the propriety of broad judicial discretion becomes questionable. For exam-
ple, bank issuances of standby letters of credit (defined in note 57 infra) conflict with the
traditional rule against banks acting as guarantors. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text
infra.
12 One commentator characterizes the dilution of letter of credit principles caused by
judicial resort of equitable doctrines as "conceptual pollution." Harfield, Code, Customs and
Conscience in Letter of Credit Law, 3 U.C.C. L.J. 7, 8 (1971). See notes 89-95 and accompany-
ing text infra.
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I
THE RATIONALE FOR BROAD JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Certain aspects of the letter of credit transaction 13 insure its
utility in the commercial setting. First, the obligation between is-
suer and beneficiary is independent of the underlying transaction
between beneficiary and customer. 4 Making payment contingent
solely upon fulfillment of conditions stipulated in the letter of
credit 15 restricts possible justifications for an issuer's default 16
and makes the financing mechanism reliable. 17 Second, it is ex-
clusively a documentary transaction. 8 The issuer must pay the
13 A letter of credit transaction typically involves three distinct agreements-the letter
of credit relationship itself, which involves the issuer and the beneficiary, the underlying
agreement between the customer and the beneficiary (e.g., for the sale and delivery of
goods), and the customer's obligation to reimburse the issuer for payments made to the
beneficiary. Harfield, supra note 3, at 257-58.
If additional parties become involved, apllications become more complex. For exam-
ple, a customer seeking a letter of credit to buy goods is often a wholesaler who may
arrange for immediate resale of the goods through a second letter of credit arrangement
that depends in part upon completion of the first. This arrangement is typically known as
back-to-back letters of credit. See, e.g., B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, at 28, 488-90, j. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 752. A second, "confirming" bank may assume the obliga-
tions of the issuer and become directly responsible to the beneficiary. See, e.g., U.C.C.
§ 5-107(2). The beneficiary may "transfer" the letter of credit or "assign" his rights thereun-
der, but only when the credit is "expressly designated as transferable or assignable," U.C.C.
§ 5-116(1), or, in the case of assignment, upon fulfillment of other conditions specified by
U.C.C. § 5-116(2).
"' See, e.g., U.C.C. § 5-114(1); Justice, supra note 1, at 426. Letters of credit necessarily
involve contractual relationships among the customer, issuer, beneficiary and other in-
terested parties. See note 13 supra. The relationship between issuer and beneficiary, how-
ever, is not strictly contractual. First, because the two typically have no prior contact with
one another before the actual presentation of documents, they do not manifest mutual
assent in the normal contractual sense. See Comment, supra note 1, at 588-90. Second, the
issuer-beneficiary obligations require no consideration. See id.; U.C.C. § 5-105. Third, the
issuer cannot assert, in an action by the beneficiary, the defenses usually available against
third party beneficiaries. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 711-12. The peculiar-
ity of the issuer-beneficiary relationship gives rise to the unique laws that govern letter of
credit transactions. See, e.g., id. at 712.
1- See U.C.C. §§ 5-109(l)(a), (2), 5-114 Comment 1; U.C.P. Articles Nine, Ten, Eleven
(1974 Rev.). The issuer determines whether or not documents comply with the letter of
credit's terms, but must exercise good faith and reasonable care in his evaluation. See
U.C.C. § 5-109 Comment 1.
16 The issuer can refuse to pay only if the documents presented do not comply with
the letter of credit's terms, or if there is "fraud," "forgery" or "fraud in the transaction."
U.C.C. § 5-114(1), (2)(b). Absent explicit contrary agreement, an issuer cannot refuse to
pay for various other reasons, such as involvency of the customer from whom it will seek
reimbursement. The issuer, therefore, bears responsibility for investigating the credit and
solvency of his customer before issuing the requested letter of credit.
t See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 841-42.
's The provisions in Article Five of the UCC reflect the draftsmen's intent to preserve
this important aspect. See U.C.C. §§ 5-109(1), (2); 5-114(1).
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face amount of the draft when the beneficiary presents complying
documents."' This discourages disputes about actions of other
parties, particularly of the customer, "t who remains outside the let-
ter of credit relationship. 21  Because they tend to prevent litiga-
tion, and can be obtained easily,22 letters of credit are convenient
and economical. Third, the letter of credit, which can serve either
a payment or financing function, 23 is permitted to operate in the
nature of a guaranty, 24 subject to restrictions. Such flexibility
makes the letter of credit adaptable to a broad range of commer-
cial uses.2
" "Documentary" credits require the beneficiary to present both a draft or demand for
payment and complying documents. At a customer's request, the requirement of complying
documents may be omitted; the result is a "clean" credit, which requires only that the
beneficiary present the draft or demand for payment to the issuer. Ske B. KOZOLCHYK,
supra note 1, at 23 n.54; Note, supra note 10, at 824.
20 See, e.g., Justice, supra note 1, at 427-29.
21 See note 14 supra. The obligations between issuer and beneficiary are independent
not only from the underlying transaction, but from the contractual agreement between
issuer and customer as well. Unfairness can result. For example, the issuer usually has no
obligation to pay the beneficiary unless the presented documents strictly comply with the
letter of credit's terms. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text infra. In certain juris-
dictions, however, the issuer can escape liability in a customer's action for wrongful honor
merely by showing that the presented documents achieved substantial compliance. See, e.g.,
Far Eastern Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D. Ohio
1977); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 731-32 (citing 3 N.Y. STATE LAw REvISION
COMM'N 1955 REPORT 1571, 1634-35 (1955) (critique of 1952 official text of Article Five for
New York Law Revision Commission by Professor Rudolf B. Schlesinger)). This bifurcated
standard of compliance creates the anomalous possibility that when presented with docu-
ments that do not strictly comply, the issuer might wrongfully pay the beneficiary and still
recover from the customer in an action for reimbursement. Alternatively, when strictly
complying documents are presented, the issuer must pay the beneficiary, even when cus-
tomer insolvency precludes his reimbursement. See, e.g., Courtaulds North America Inc. v.
North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92 (M.D.N.C.) (issuer held liable to beneficiary
despite customer's insolvency), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975).
22 The UCC requires only that they be in writing and signed by the issuer. See U.C.C.
§ 5-104(1). Administrative regulations impose other guidelines on the issuance of standby
credits. See, e.g., notes 60, 72 infra.
23 See note 14 supra.
14 Guarantee or "standby" letters of credit significantly differ from conventional com-
mercial credits. See notes 58, 60-65, and accompanying text infra. In conventional letter of
credit transactions, the parties contemplate payment upon performance or completion of
some act (e.g., delivery of goods). Parties to a standby letter of credit, however, condition
payment upon some default of performance or payment in the underlying transaction. See,
e.g., Katskee, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate-The Case for Congressional Resolution, 92
BANKING L.J. 697, 699 (1975). See also note 57 and accompanying text infra.
25 Standby credits have been used as substitutes not only for traditional letters of credit,
but for other devices as well. The use of standby credits in the domain of suretyship has
generated much debate concerning the legality and desirability of such devices. See note 24
supra and note 71 infra.
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The advantage of letters of credit-reliability, convenience,
economy, and flexibility-would be lost if the laws governing
them were highly complex and restrictive. Statutory codifica-
tions,26 consequently, are general and incomplete. 27  Applicable
sections of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) merely attempt
to provide a broad theoretical framework, leaving to courts the
responsibility for developing interstitial areas of letter of credit
law. 28
26 Two codifications typically apply to letter of credit transactions in the United States: the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE and the UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR COMMERCIAL
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1974 Rev.). The UCC, drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, "gives statutory
recognition to the fundamental principles [of letters of credit] and it is thus consistent both
with the antecedent common law of letters of credit and ... with the commercial and
financial practices out of which the device has developed." H. HARFIELD, supra note 2, at
228 (footnote omitted). The UCP, drafted in 1929 and updated periodically by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, "set[s] forth a series of fairly generalized rules expressing
the understanding of bankers as to the mechanics of operating" commercial letters of cre-
dit. Id. at 225. Although recognized within the United States as well as internationally, the
UCP rules are usually binding domestically only to the extent that they do not conflict with
the UCC and are "incorporated by reference" by the parties. Thus, the UCP does not
always govern parties' rights in letters of credit disputes within the United States. See note
18 infra.
27 U.C.C. Article Five, for example, states:
This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of letters of
credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act or may hereaf-
ter develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not by itself require,
imply or negate application of the same or a converse rule to a situation not
provided for or to a person not specified by this Article.
U.C.C. § 5-102(3). Comments accompanying various provisions of Article Five explicitly
reserve specific questions for resolution by the courts. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 5-103 Comment 1
(leaving to courts the issue of how to identify a letter of credit as revocable or irrevocable
in the absence of express provision in the agreement); U.C.C. § 5-116, Comment 1 (due to
"general confusion of thought," as to the meaning of "assignment or transfer of a credit,"
the "law remains uncertain."); note 45 and accompanying text infra. As one expert has
noted, the Code's draftsmen "did their best to devise a two-way stretch girdle instead of a
plaster cast." H. HARFIELD, supra note 2, at 228.
28 See U.C.C. § 5-101 Comment. Many commentators recognize that the UCP, like the
UCC, leaves considerable discretion to the parties in a transaction and to the courts. Kozol-
chyk asserts, "[u]seful as the text of the U.C.P. has been and is as a guideline for bankers
and immediate parties to the letters of credit transaction, its claim to the status of a fully
binding codification is not supported by the tenor of its provisions." B. KOZOLCHYK, supra
note 1, at 88. Kozolchyk reports the more unequivocal view of two British commentators,
Gutteridge and Megrah, who conclude that "nowhere do the Uniform Customs have the
force of law." Id. (citing H. GUTTERIDGE & M. MEGRAH, THE LAW OF BANKER' COMMERCIAL
CREDITS 176 (3d ed. 1962)). Harfield explains that "[the UCP provisions] do not purport to
be mandates, and consequently each successive alteration of the written [UCP] rules rep-
resented a recognition of a change in custom rather than a directive as to the ways the
business thereafter should be done." H. HARFIELD, supra note 2, at 227 (footnote omitted).
See generally B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, at 94-95; Note, Documentary Letters of Credit and the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (1974 Rev.): A Selective Analysis, 3 J.
Cop. L. 147 (1977); Comment, supra note 3, at 154-60.
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Draftsmen of the UCC asserted in Comments that "no statute
can effectively or wisely codify all the possible law of letters of
credit without stultifying further development of this useful
financing device."". Keeping general principles in mind, courts
applying Article Five of the Code are to follow the "canon of lib-
eral interpretation," so that judicial decisions advance "underlying
purposes and policies" 30 of letter of credit law. Unfortunately,
this broad judicial discretion has begun to undermine, rather than
promote, the letter of credit's basic utility.
II
JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING
In several areas, the UCC has left to the courts the responsi-
bility for creating guidelines for implementing letter of credit
principles. 31 The courts, however, have failed to perform this
task adequately. The few reported letter of credit cases 32 reflect
inconsistent, confusing doctrine in important areas, 33 and suggest
that legislative action is necessary to restore predictability to com-
mercial transactions.
Parties frequently incorporate the UCP into letter of credit agreements. See J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 717. In four states, stipulation by the parties that the letter
of credit is partially or wholly subject to the UCP will preclude applicability of the UCC,
and render the UCP exclusively controlling. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 5-102(4) (1975); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 44-2702(D) (1967); MO. REV. STAT. § 400.5-102(4) (1978); N.Y. U.C.C. §
5-102(4) (McKinney 1964). See, e.g., Capehart Corp. v. Shanghai Commercial Bank, Ltd.,
49 A.D.2d 521, 369 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1st Dep't 1975) (holding the UCC inapplicable to a
letter of credit that expressly designated the UCP as controlling). In other states, the UCC
will apply whether or not the letter of credit agreement. incorporates the UCP by refer-
ence.
21 U.C.C. § 5-102 Comment 2.
30 Id.
31 The UCC draftsmen carefully preserved the parties' "freedom of contract" through
repeated use of the phrase "unless otherwise agreed." J. WHITE & R. SummERS, supra note
3, at 717 (citing Comment, "Unless Otherwise Agreed" and Article 5: An Exercise in Freedom of
Contract, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 416 (1967)). Thus, many UCC provisions will not apply if
parties have provided alternative arrangements in their letter of credit agreement. Article
Five, moreover, does not address every contingency. Courts must therefore resolve am-
biguities in areas where both codified rules and the parties' express provisions are silent,
and often look to contract and suretyship principles to reach decisions. Parties can enhance
legal certainty in most cases through careful drafting. As one commentator has noted,
however, "effective letter of credit usage requires imposition of prophylactic rules to pre-
vent abuses." Note, supra note 10, at 855.
2 See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 10, at 848 (noting paucity of letter of credit cases).
'3 See Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699 (1st
Cir. 1978); Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230 (1st Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); United States Indus., Inc. v. Second New Haven
1980]
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A. Standards of Compliance
Letter of credit litigation most frequently arises from disputes
about whether presented documents comply with the terms and
conditions specified in the credit agreement. 34 The issuer is usu-
ally responsible for drafting the letter of credit's provisions. 35  Al-
though courts will construe any ambiguous terms as strongly as
possible against him, 36 the issuer retains the'power to decide ini-
tially whether documents presented by the beneficiary comply
with the letter of credit's conditions. 37  This may induce him to
look beyond the documents themselves to facts concerning the
underlying transaction to justify dishonor of presented drafts.3 8  A
court evaluating his actions, in turn, must also look beyond the
documents to ascertain the propriety of honor or dishonor.39
Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662 (D. Conn. 1978); Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific
Nat'l Bank, 343 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd 493 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1974); United
Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976); Fair Pavilions, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 19 N.Y.2d 512, 227
N.E.2d 839, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1967). See notes 40-53, 57-59, 64-71, 89-96, & 99-105, and
accompanying text infra.
J j. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 729.
3 Bank issuers customarily stipulate the conditions on a standard form. For samples of
forms used, see H. GUTrTERIDGE & M. MEGRAH, supra note 5, at 224-41. See note 36 infra.
3 For example, in East Girard Sav. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d
598 (5th Cir. 1979), the issuing bank had used a letter of credit form designed for a sale of
goods transaction as a guaranty to finance construction of an apartment complex. Result-
ing confusion about compliance conditions prompted the court to dispense with the
documentation requirement. Id. at 602-03.
37 U.C.C. § 5-109(2) states: "[ain issuer must examine documents with care so as to
ascertain that on their face they appear to comply with the terms of the credit ...." An
issuer uncertain about the sufficiency of submitted documents may reasonably ask for addi-
tional supporting information. Absent adequate supporting material, the issuer "pays at its
peril." See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank . Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977);
First Nat'l Bank v. Rosebud Hous. Auth., 291 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1980).
38 The issuer might, for example, look for "fraud," "forgery," or "fraud in the transac-
tion," even though he had no obligation to do so to defend his refusal to pay under
§ 5-114(2). See Note, supra note 5, at 838; notes 89-90 and accompanying text infra.
Many aspects of standby credits make the issuer especially reluctant to honor drafts or
demands for payment. First, in a typical standby credit transaction, the parties do not
anticipate payment unless something goes wrong-default of performance, for example.
See note 24 supra. By contrast, in a conventional letter of credit situation, the issuer and the
parties expect payment following completion of the underlying transaction. Second, unlike
the issuer of a traditional letter of credit, who receives documents of title before paying out
money, the standby issuer receives only notice of default, and must pay before being reim-
bursed and without receiving anything of value. See, e.g,, Verkuil, supra note 1, at 723.
Third, the insolvency of the customer often causes a default in the underlying transaction
that prompts the demandfor payment. In such a case, the standby issuer's prospects of
reimbursement after payment are minimal. Id. at 723-24.
39 In Bank of N.C. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1978), the court up-
held, as a valid letter of credit, an arrangement in which one bank agreed to purchase a
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The UCC draftsmen explicitly left to the judiciary the task of
choosing an appropriate standard of compliance. 40  Case law,
however, illustrates the inability of courts to reconcile their re-
sponsibility to promote fairness in particular cases with promoting
the commercial reliability that letters of credit should provide in
transactions. 4' Responding to the silence of Article Five, many
courts have continued to apply an objective pre-Code test of
"strict compliance," 42 which requires that presented documents
scrupulously adhere to the letter of credit's terms.43  Neverthe-
less, some courts have deviated from the stringent standard tb
achieve fair results in particular cases.44 The parties themselves
promissory note pursuant to a previously executed instrument. The parties had agreed,
however, that the issuer would honor the credit upon presentation of "a promissory note"
and only "in an amount not to exceed [the] unpaid balance of principal and interest due
upon presentation." Id. at 204. As Judge Bauer noted in dissent, the "unpaid balance"
could not be discerned from the face of the presented note alone, and "no other 'docu-
ment' [was] required by the letter to affirmatively settle what the 'unpaid balance of princi-
pal and interest' [was]." Id. at 209. Judge Bauer concluded:
[Blecause the issuing bank cannot ascertain the extent of its liability under the
letter by relying on the required documents alone and must ascertain facts ex-
trinsic to the documents in which it is dealing, this instrument cannot be
deemed a "letter of credit," at least in its normative commercial sense.
Id. Judge Bauer praised the majority's goal but took issue with its strategy: "Perhaps the
Court is straining to do what it perceives as equity. If so, it does so in an inequitable
manner ...." Id. at 210.
40 "The more important areas not covered by this Article revolve around the question
of when documents in fact and in law do or do not comply with the terms of the credit."
U.C.C. § 5-102 Comment 2.
41 The desire of courts to achieve fair results has adversely affected not only certainty
of compliance standards, but of remedies for wrongful honor as well. For the related prob-
lem of equity's intrusion into the practical fashioning of remedies, see note 103 infra.
42 The strict compliance doctrine long preceded the UCC. See, e.g., Camp v. Corn
Exch. Nat'l Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 342, 132 A. 189, 191 (1926). Early versions of the UCP
sought to preserve the judicially developed standard by emphasizing that banks should
exercise great care in ascertaining compliance. See UCP art. 9 (1951 rev.), discussed in B.
KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, at 260. Cases decided under the UCC reflect widespread judicial
reaffirmance of the doctrine. See, e.g., Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank
Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1979); Sisalcords Do Brazil, Ltd.- v. Fiacao Brasileira De
Sisal, S.A., 450 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Venizelos
S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970).
43 Even courts that faithfully apply the strict compliance rule do not achieve absolute
strictness in all cases. For a discussion- of the unavoidability of complications in the commer-
cial setting, see B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, at 259, 262-69.
" See Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 705
(1st Cir. 1978); Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 234
(1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); United States Indus., Inc. v. Second New
Havdn Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 664-65 (D. Conn. 1978). In Banco, the First Circuit noted
that the strict compliance standard seemed to have "mellowed" in the English courts. 385
F.2d at 234 n.3. For discussion of the general relaxation of the traditional strict adherence
to letter of credit principles, see Harfield, supra note 12, at 13-14.
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may include in the letter of credit a stipulation that "substantial
compliance" is sufficient.4" This increases the probability that a
court, as well as the parties, will look beyond the documents to
other conditions and events in the transaction.46
The broad judicial discretion that the UCC permits may
tempt courts to relax the strict compliance standard where that
standard would not protect the legitimate interests of the par-
45 Judicial adoption of a substantial compliance standard differs from a stipulation
made by the parties in the agreement that the presented documents must "substantially
satisfy" the issuer. The latter introduces into the relationship the subjective judgment of
the issuer which, in effect, gives him broad power to cancel or dishonor the credit, subject
only to the UCC's requirement of "good faith" (U.C.C. § 1-203). In the case of "irrevoca-
ble" credits, the UCC prohibits the issuer from drafting such a provision into the agree-
ment. See U.C.C. § 5-114(1); U.C.C. § 5-114 Comment 1; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 3, at 728-30.
The substantial compliance standard, like the test of strict compliance, arose long be-
fore states enacted the UCC. See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Liberty
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 116 F. Supp. 233, 243 (W.D. Okla. 1953), aff'd, 218 F.2d 831
(10th Cir. 1955). Early critics of the UCC lamented that Article Five did not require appli-
cation of any one standard. See Comment, Letters of Credit Under the Proposed Uniform Com-
mercial Code: An Opportunity Missed, 62 YALE L.J. 227, 243-50 (1953). Similarly, recent revi-
sions of the UCP clearly allow banks considerable discretion in ascertaining compliance. See
B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, at 2b0. Although post-Code case law reflects the pre-
dominance of the strict compliance standard, some courts recognize exceptions, such as the
expressed or implied waiver by the customer of the requirements stipulated in the letter of
credit. See, e.g., Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236-37
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). But see Courtaulds North American Inc.
v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92 (M.D.N.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d
802 (4th Cir. 1975).
46 In Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 231 (Ist
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968), letters of credit for a transaction involving the
sale of goods explicitly required the presentation of inspection certificates specifying that
the goods sent were "in conformity with the order." The certificates actually presented to
the bank stated that the goods were found " 'conforming to the conditions estipulated [sic]
on the Order-Stock-sheets.'" Id. at 233. The seller-beneficiary had given the inspectors
samples instead of the actual goods, but the seller claimed under oath that the samples
"corresponded" with goods that the buyer had approved when the parties originally exe-
cuted the agreement. Id. at 236. Despite documentary deviations from the letter of credit
terms (which appeared to have required that the goods themselves be inspected), the First
Circuit held that the presented inspection certificates "conformed in all significant respects"
to the requirements of the letter of credit. Id. at 237. The court commented, "[W]e note
some leaven in the loaf of strict construction. Not only does haec verba not control abso-
lutely ... but some courts now cast their eyes on a wider scene than a single document." Id.
at 234 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
During various stages of a letter of credit transaction, the parties themselves may be
tempted to look beyond the presented documents at facts surrounding the underlying con-
tract. This can occur, for example, when parties at the drafting stage seek to define condi-
tions of compliance. See Harfield, supra note i2, at 15; Note, supra note 10, at 836-37 n.94.
It can also occur later, when the issuer evaluates the compliance of documents presented
by the beneficiary. See note 102 and accompanying text infra.
LETTERS OF CREDIT
ties.47  One court has held that discrepancies between stipulated
conditions and documents presented would not justify dishonor of
drafts where "there is no possibility that the documents could mis-
lead the paying bank to its detriment." 48 In that case, the
issuer-bank clearly knew that all conditions of the credit had been
fulfilled; nonetheless, the bank sought to escape its obligation to
pay because of minor defects in the documents. 4 "
Although some courts that overlook minor documentary de-
fects deny they have diluted the objective standard, 50 they have
injected a "subjective element" into the-requirement of com-
pliance)' According to one commentator, "once courts begin
inquiring into the state of mind of the issuing bank, the doctrine
of strict compliance has lost its starch." 52 Decisions that allow
such exceptions may "introduce the kind of uncertainty [in letter
of credit transactions] that the doctrine of strict compliance was
designed to eliminate." 3 If courts become uncertain about com-
pliance standards, they may look to the terms of the underlying
contract, thereby violating the letter of credit's independence.5 4
Ad hoc policy-oriented decisions that impose individually-tailored
solutions undercut the stability and certainty that are generally
important in commercial transactions, and essential in letter of
credit transactions. 5
Because neither the UCC nor the state legislatures have ar-
ticulated a policy of strict compliance, dilution of the strict com-
pliance standard is not demonstrably inconsistent with current
law. The state legislatures should settle the issue by requiring a
strict compliance standard. Such guidance will restore predictabil-
ity by divesting the courts of their policymaking role in this area.
'7 See, e.g., Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699
(1st Cir. 1978).
48 Id. at 705 (emphasis in original).
'9 The court concluded that the drawer of drafts had "complied with the requirements
of the letter of credit in every material respect." Id.
.O See, e.g., id. ("We do not see these rulings as retreats from rigorous insistence on
compliance with letter of credit requirements.").
41 Letters of Credit: How Strict Is the Rule of Strict Compliance?, 3 LENDING L.F. No. 8,
August, 1979, at 7, 8 (1979).
42 Id.
:3 Id.
• ,4 See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 842-45, 854 n.184.
' See, e.g., Harfield, supra note 12, at 9-10. See also notes 80-82 and accompanying text
infra.
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B. Control of Standby Letters of Credit
The courts have played an active and influential role in
developing the law governing standby letters of credit. 5 6  In a
typical standby arrangement, the issuer's obligation to pay is
contingent upon the customer's own default in payment or per-
formance."7 Applied in many diverse con.texts, standby credits
involve more risks than traditional credits.5 8  Although the UCC
makes no explicit reference to them, courts have interpreted Arti-
cle Five of the UCC as governing standby credits.5J
Standby credits tend to encroach on principles that are basic
to the notions of traditional letters of credit, raising serious doubt
about the propriety of holding the UCC applicable to standby
'6 The challenge for courts stems primarily from the definitional problems, see note 24
supra; notes 66-71 and accompanying text infra, and the increased variety of uses of
standby letters of credit, see notes 9-10 supra.
'7 Although standby letters of credit are readily distinguishable from conventional let-
ters of credit, see note 24 supra, they closely resemble guaranties. The standby letter of
credit, like the conventional credit, establishes an independent, quasi-contractual arrange-
ment directly between the issuer and the beneficiary. The issuer's obligation, always to pay
money, is primary with respect to the beneficiary and arises upon the presentation of com-
plying documents. The issuer's obligation is secondary with respect to the underlying
transaction and is related to, although not always dependent upon, the customer's own
duties and obligations. A guaranty, on the other hand, is "a contract that is ancillary to
some other contract or relationship... " H. HARFIELD, supra note 2, at 164. The guaran-
tor's obligation is usually to pay money, and is primary with respect to the underlying
contract. It arises upon the occurrence of some agreed condition related to the underlying
contract, typically defalt in payment or performance. The guarantor's obligations, there-
fore, must be determined by reference to the underlying contract. Id. However justifiable
theoretically, the practical distinction between standby letters of credit and "true" guaran-
ties often collapses when applied by the courts. See notes 66-73 and accompanying text
infra.
58 Issuers in particular face greater risks. See note 38 supra. Any adverse effects on
issuers, particularly large banks (which are the major issuers of standby credits), also have
repercussions throughout the economy. The insolvency of the U.S. National Bank of San
Diego, which occur-red unexpectedly in 1973, is a good example. See First Empire Bank v.
FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978); Failure of the U.S. National
Bank of San Diego: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973); Verkuil, Bank Solvency and
Standby Letters of Credit: Lessons from the USNB Failure, 53 TUL. L. REv. 314 (1979).
59 The Official Comment to the scope provision of Article Five states that presented
documents may include "a notice of default of some kind...." U.C.C. § 5-102 Comment 1.
U.C.C. § 5-102 itself provides "Unless the engagement meets the requirements of subsec-
tion (1), this Article does not apply to ... guarantees .. " U.C.C. § 5-102(2). For cases
upholding as legitimate bank obligations letters of credit serving the guarantee function,
see Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1231-32 & n.10 (5th
Cir. 1973) (and cases cited therein), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); American Empire
Ins. Co. v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 409 F. Supp. 459, 463-65 (M.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d
564 (3d Cir. 1977).
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credits. For example, standby credits often fail to identify a single,
named beneficiary. 0  This conflicts with the nature of a letter of
credit as a clearly defined, independent contractual agreement be-
tween issuer and beneficiary." 1  In addition, expansive use of
standby credits encourages parties to draft the documents in ex-
cessive detail,6 2 which in turn invites subsequent litigation.!3
The expanding use of standby credits has created many prob-
lems for courts. 64  This is largely due to the functional overlaps
between standby credits issued by national banks and illegal
60 See Verkuil, supra note 1, at 724. The Comptroller of the Currency has sought to
remedy this by promulgating 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1980), which permits a national bank to
issue credits only "to or on behalf of its customer." See Comment, supra note 1, at 616.
61 Verkuil, supra note 1, at 724.
62 Id. See also Harfield, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate, 94 BANKING L.J. 293, 294-95
(1977).
0 See generally Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d
1285, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g per curiam, 343 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 197'1); Verkuil,
supra note 1, at 724.
64 See Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 566 S.W.2d 358, 362 (Tex. Civ.
App.), rev'd, 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978), citing Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l
Bank, 282 F. 73 (5th Cir. 1922), cert. denied and dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 260 U.S. 701
(1922) (instrument held void as an illegal guaranty although the parties had labelled it
letter of credit); New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 N.J. 33, 389 A.2d 454 (1978) (guaranty
instrument upheld as a standby letter of credit although the parties had not labelled it as a
such). The credit agreement in Palladino did not call for written notice of default to the
issuer as a prerequisite for payments. Nevertheless, the court, resorting to contract princi-
ples, read a written notice requirement into the agreement and construed the instrument
as a standby letter of credit: "Terms will be implied in a contract where the parties must
have intended them because they are necessary to give business efficacy to the contract as
written." Id. at 46, 389 A.2d at 461. In Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific
Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 1285, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g per curiam, 343 F. Supp. 332
(N.D. Cal. 1971), the Ninth Circuit expressly refused to follow the pattern set by other
courts in distinguishing standby credits from guaranties on the basis of primary as opposed
to secondary liability.
Judicial power to interpret ambiguous language gives the courts great discretion in
resolving standby disputes. In Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133
(W.D. Ill. 1976), the court held that the standby letter of credit was not irrevocable, even
though the parties had used the word "guarantee" in the standby instrument; the validity
of a revocation that had occurred before the documents were presented was held to be
valid. The intentions of the parties constituted relevant evidence, but were not dispositive.
In Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734 (D. Minn.
1976), the court found that a loan commitment standby fee was an illegal penalty provision
with respect to the underlying transaction between customer and beneficiary. Nevertheless,
the court held that the issuing bank was obligated, upon presentation of the necessary
documents, to honor the letter of credit issued in that amount. Emphasizing the indepen-
dence of the letter of credit transaction and the risk of the customer's insolvency assumed
by the issuing bank, the court said: "[We are] ... not unmindful of defendant's argument
that payment on the letter of credit will allow plaintiff a 'windfall' profit. This argument, in
[our] opinion, has no legal significance ... and does not prevent -the entry of summary
,judgment in favor of the plaintiff." Id. at 736.
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guaranties.6 - Courts created a theoretical distinction between
standby credits and illegal guaranties, 66 but in practice the distinc-
tion has proven untenable.6 7  By definition, a letter of credit
relationship creates a primary obligation on the part of the issuer
to pay the beneficiary.6 8  In contrast, a guaranty creates a secon-
dary obligation in the guarantor "to answer for another's
debt." 69 Standby letters of credit typically contemplate payment
by the issuer when the customer himself has defaulted in paying
the beneficiary.7 0  In this respect, standby credits are functionally
equivalent to guaranties. 7 1
65 National banks (and most state banks) may exercise only those powers expressly
granted by statute, and "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking." National Bank Act of 1864 Art. I, § 13 (empowering section)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)). Some courts during the nineteenth century construed
the Act to permit national banks to issue guaranties when the exercise of such power is a
"necessary incident" to the pursuit of banking business, or the protection of rights. See, e.g.,
Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 297 (1895); People's Bank v. Manufacturers' Nat'l
Bank, 101 U.S. 181, 183 (1879). However, courts thereafter abandoned this view and have
uniformly held that the issuance of guaranties by national banks is ultra vires. See, e.g.,
Kimen v. Atlas Exch. Nat'l Bank, 92 F.2d 615, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 650 (1938); Merchants' Bank v. Baird, 160 F. 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1908). See 120 CONG.
REC. 29796-97 (1974) (memorandum submitted by Timothy D. Naegele). See generally H.
HARFIELD, supra note 2, at 162-63.
66 See, e.g., Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 77-78 (5th Cir. 1922)
("guaranty" held not to be incompatible with letter of credit), cert. denied and dismissed for
want of jurisdiction, 260 U.S. 701 (1922). See generally Campbell, Guaranties and the Suretyship
Phases of Letters of Credit, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 261-67 (1936-37). Although "it is still
asserted that any practice that resembles a guarantee or lending of someone else's credit is
ultra vires for the bank," B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, at 630, "the conclusion need not
necessarily be that 'a national or state bank or trust company clearly has no power to
guarantee contracts made by others.'" Id. at 632 (quoting ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING
5122 (1936)). Cf. Russel Grader Mfg. Co. v. Farmers Exch. State Bank, 49 N.D. 999, 1002,
194 N.W. 387, 389 (1923) (banks are impliedly authorized to issue letters of credit). The
judicially-developed prohibition against bank issuances of guaranties arose in the
nineteenth century to prevent monopolies, avoid undue bank participation in land specula-
tion, and generally to prevent banks from exercising greater powers than those conferred
by statute and their corporate charters. Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of
Credit Controversy, 96 BANKING L.J. 46, 52-54 (1979). Courts continue to apply the rule
without reevaluating its rationale. See note 79 infra.
6'7 See Lord, supra note 66, at 46-47 & n.3 (citing recent cases); id. at 63 (suggesting that
the distinction drawn by courts is "artificial"); note 64 infra.
68 Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 1, at 279-80. See, e.g., Asociacion de Azucareros de
Guat. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 423 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970); note 57 supra.
69 L. SimpSoN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 8 n.9 (1950). See Dubuque Pack-
ing Co. v. Fitzgibbon, 27 U.C.C. REP. 188, 189-90 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979); Border Nat'l
Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1922), cert. denied and dismissed for
want of jurisdiction, 260 U.S. 701 (1922) (discussed in H. HARFIELD, supra note 2, at 155);
Note, supra note 10, at 831 n.66; note 57 supra.
10 See, e.g., Jarvis, Standby Letters of Credit-Issuers' Subrogation and Assignment Rights-Part
I, 9 U.C.C. L.J. 356, 359 (1977); Katskee, supra note 24, at 699, 702 (quoting Harfield,
supra note 3, at 258); note 57 and accompanying text supra.
71 Verkuil, supra note 1, at 725. Disagreement among commentators about whether
guaranties and standby credits differ, and if so, how they are distinguishable, reflects the
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Unfortunately, administrative agencies have followed the ju-
dicial distinction between standby credits and guaranties instead of
resolving the ambiguity.72 The fungibility of the two concepts in-
creases the potential for arbitrary decisions based on policy con-
confusion and uncertainty surrounding standby credits. See Katskee, supra note 24, at 697-
714. To differentiate courts look to the "phraseology of the writing, the object sought to be
accomplished thereby, and the precise obligation and conditions imposed on and assumed
by the parties thereto." 6 MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING 414, ch. 12, & 13 (1975). See, e.g.,
Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 566 S.W.2d 358, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd,
578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978). Commentators, meanwhile, have observed that such efforts
may be futile. See, e.g., Lord, supra note 66, at 61-63; Sayre, "Clean" Letters of Credit, J. COM.
BANK LENDING 56, 62 (1973) (cited in Note, supra note 10, at 831 n.65); Verkuil, supra note
1, at 724-26.
72 The Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve Board have
each issued regulations which, following the case law, recognize a distinction between
standby credits and illegal guaranties. Each has promulgated a formal definition of standby
letters of credit. The Comptroller, for example, defines the standby letter of credit as
any letter of credit, or similar arrangement however named or described, which
represents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer (I) to repay
money borrowed by or advanced to or for the account of the account party or
(2) to make payment on account of any indebtedness undertaken by the ac-
count party, or (3) to make payment on account of any default by the account
party in the performance of an obligation.
12 C.F.R. § 7.1160 (1980) (footnote omitted). See the definitions adopted by the Federal
Reserve Board (12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d)(1) (1980)) and the FDIC (12 C.F.R. § 337.2(a) (1980)).
The Comptroller has also issued guidelines regulating the use of standby credits. 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.7016 (1980) affirms the power of national banks to issue letter of credit of all types
under the UCC or UCP, subject to five conditions. First, banks can only issue credits to or
on behalf of their own identified customers. But see note 60 supra. Second, the letter of
credit must specifically state that it is a letter of credit or be conspicuously so entitled.
Third, the credit must be limited to a definite time period. Fourth, the bank's obligation
may arise only upon presentation of a draft or other documents stated in the credit and
must be limited in amount. Fifth, the bank's customer has an unqualified obligation to
reimburse the bank for appropriate payments. For a discussion of these requirements, and
some complications caused by their application, see Note, supra note 1, at 615-21.
Despite their promulgation of regulations defining and setting guidelines for standby
credits, the administrative agencies, like the courts, have emphasized but not resolved the
confusing similarity between standby credits and guaranties. The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency has adopted the view of Professor Lord, supra note 66, at 62-63, that "the courts ...
should reconsider the nonguaranty rule and determine if it is still viable in today's banking
world." Coniptroller of the Currency Staff Interpretive Ruling 71.010, Letter No. 121 (Sept. 19,
1979), Standby Letter of Credit, [ 1979] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,207. The Comptrol-
ler suggests that banks should "observe the formalities" prescribed in current regulations
and rulings "[u]ntil the Congress or the courts ... act to clarify or change the legal ground
rules .. " Id. As one expert has noted, "[t]he bank regulatory agencies have moved timidly
at best in regulating standby letters of credit and other similar obligations; and there is no
reason to believe they will do otherwise in the absence of congressional prodding." SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., COMPENDIUM OF
MAJOR ISSUES IN BANK REGULATION 674 (Comm. Print 1975) (report submitted by Timothy
D. Naegele). Further, "it is questionable whether the agencies have sufficient statutory au-
thority to implement [proposed changes] even if they were prodded into doing so." Id.
Thus, it may be fruitless to rely upon the agencies alone to initiate, in unified fashion, the
necessary changes in letter of credit law.
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siderations. The absence of a principled and reliable method of
distinguishing between guaranties and standby credits has thus
seriously undermined predictability in this area. 73
The high risks created by excessive bank issuances of standby
credits have generated recent reform efforts.74 Congress has
considered but not enacted various bills that would limit, depend-
ing on the value of available bank assets, the total volume of
standby credits a bank could issue. 75  Advocates of reform have
emphasized the dangers of bank insolvency 76 and other harmful
73 See note 67 supra.
7' The unexpected insolvency of the United States National Bank of San Diego in 1974
(see note 58 supra), its drastic repercussions, and the continuing rapid increase in total
volume of domestic standby credits issued, see note 9 supra, have prompted the introduc-
tion of various proposals in Congress. See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
75 The 93d Congress considered but did not act upon a bill sponsored by Senator
Brooke that would have made standby credits subject to the federal statutory limits on total
liabilities of a national bank. See S. 3949, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 29791-95
(1974). Proponents of S. 3949 viewed the insolvency risks of standby credits to justify the
imposition of reserve requirements. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29792-93 (1974) (remarks of
Sen. Brooke).
The federal law requires that national banks refrain from becoming indebted "to an
amount exceeding the amount [100%] of its capital stock ... plus 50 percent of the
amount of its unimpaired surplus fund, [subject to listed exceptions]." 12, U.S.C. § 82
(1976). Reserve requirements serve the dual purpose of facilitating control over monetary
policy and insuring that banks have funds available to meet their obligations. See AMERICAN
BANKERe REPRINT SERV., THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON FI-
NANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION (THE HUNT COMMISSION) 17 (pamphlet 1972) (reprint-
ing AMERICAN BANKER, Dec. 17, 23, and 24, 1971); Katskee, supra note 24, at 708-10.
The 94th Congress, after extensive hearings, failed to enact a bill (S.2347) substantially
similar to the earlier proposal. See Regulation of Standby Letters of Credit: Hearings on S.2347
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S.2347]. In the 95th Congress, the Senate passed the Fi-
nancial Institutions Supervisory Act Amendments of 1977, which, like earlier proposals, set
forth guidelines and limitations for the issuance of standby credits. S.71, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 27398-411 (1977). Due to inaction by the House, however, the bill
was not enacted into law. For a review of Congress' activity and a discussion of its proposed
measures, see Verkuil, supra note 58, at 319-23, 325-27.
The most recent bill considered, S. 71, would include standby credits as well as other
presently excluded bank liabilities (e.g., ineligible surety agreements and bank acceptances)
in the calculation of a bank's total liabilities. The legal limit for all liabilities of a national
bank would be 50% of the bank's surplus plus 50% .of its capital stock. See Verkuil, supra
note 58, at 320-21.
76 See generally Hearings on S.2347, supra note 75. Commentators advocating reform
have dwelled more on the economic dangers arising from the absence of controls over
standby credits than on the problems courts face in applying whatever controls currently
exist. The arguments by commentators for and against controls reflect opposing
philosophical views about the general role of letters of credit in the economy. One writer
characterizes the nonreformists as "commercial progressives" and the reformists as
"economic conservatives." Katskee, supra note 24, at 697.
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economic consequences associated with standby credits. 77  Legisla-
tures, however, have not addressed the judicially unresolved prob-
lem of adequately distinguishing standby letters of credit from
guaranties.
In the absence of legislative reform, courts will probably con-
tinue to manipulate the tenuous distinction between standby cre-
dits and illegal guaranties to achieve fair results. The policy
considerations that have generated legislative reform efforts will
probably also influence judicial decisionmaking. Courts, however,
are not competent to make the proper policy choices, and judicial
decisions based upon equitable considerations will not promote
certainty in commercial transactions. A New Jersey Supreme
Court justice, dissenting from the court's approval of a disputed
standby letter of credit transaction,7 8 recently expressed ap-
prehension over excessive judicial policymaking in this area:
Whether or not the letter in litigation here is as a matter of
form classifiable as a standby letter of credit, its substantial
identity with a guarantee as commonly understood is so obvious
that one would desire more explicit legislative approval of its
validity as a bank obligation than was evident in 1972 when the
instant transaction took place. I do not favor erosion of an ap-
parently salutary statutory policy against bank guaranties
through judicial ratification of a contrary commercial practice.
It may well be that a new emerging policy of commercial convenience
should swing the law in a new direction. But I should hope for a clear
legislative signal to that effect. 79
77 Excessive standby issuances may increase the rate of inflation. One expert, advocat-
ing congressional action to regulate standby credits, commented in 1974:
More than at any other time in the past decade .... the dampening of inflation
is of paramount importance. If banks are to be permitted by law to issue
standby letters of credit, those liabilities should be subject to reserve require-
ments-whether or not funds are actally received and maintained by the
bank-in order to prevent this form of bank credit from further fueling infla-
tion.
Letter of Timothy D. Naegele to Sen. Brooke, reprinted in Hearings on S.2347, supra note
75, at 233. The inflationary effects of standby credits are particularly acute during periods
of tight monetary policy. See, e.g., Hearings on S.2347, supra note 75, at 105-06 (statement of
Alvin Zises, President, Prulease, Inc.). As one writer states: "Establishing clear demarcation
lines between the two forms [i.e., standby credit and guaranty] is essential to the develop-
ment of a documentary security device that can effectively protect the intent of the par-
ties." Note, supra note 10, at 828 (emphasis added).
7" New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 N.J. 33, 389 A.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (Conford,
Temp. J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 48-49, 389 A.2d at 462 (Conford, Temp. J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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The legislatures, however, have ignored such entreaties for guid-
ance from the judiciary.
Legislatures should reexamine the rationale of the rule
against guaranties. If the rule is retained, the lawmakers should
delineate clearer guidelines by which courts can categorize a par-
ticular device as a standby or guaranty. Only more structured laws
can restrict judicial discretion and restore predictability in the
commercial setting.
III
RESORT TO EQUITABLE REMEDIES:
CUSTOMER'S REMEDY FOR WRONGFUL HONOR
Henry Harfield, a leading authority on letters of credit, stated
almost a decade ago, "[t]he right to enforce express terms, without
reference to equities, has long been recognized in letter-of-credit law,
and is essential to the proper functioning of the letter-of-credit
device." 80 Harfield displayed a prophetic pessimism, predicting
that the increasing diversity of letter of credit applications would
create temptation for courts to err8 by "contaminat[ing]" letter of
credit principles with equitable doctrines to achieve fair results. 82
As Harfield predicted, courts have introduced equitable con-
siderations in adjudicating letter of credit disputes. These princi-
ples often conflict with the letter of credit's strictly documentary
nature, and with the notion that the letter of credit is indepen-
dent from the underlying transaction. Consequently, the influx of
equity has compromised the chief virtues of letters of credit: re-
liability, convenience, simplicity and predictability.
The absence of explicit statutory guidance has left courts with
the task of determining what remedies are available to customers
80 Harfield, supra note 12, at 14 (emphasis added).
81 Mr. Harfield states:
The cases that I see on tomorrow's calendar are those in which the constructive
ingenuity of lawyers and bankers has used the letter-of-credit device to ac-
complish results that previously had to be accomplished by performance bonds,
or repurchase agreements, or in other ways will use the letter-of-credit device
to solve problems that hitherto have not been, but should be, solved. It is in this
class of case, in which the facts are sufficiently different from the facts in the
case that made the law, and in this atmosphere of instant equity, that the courts
will find what I fear may be an almost irresistable opportunity to go wrong.
Id.
82 Id. at 8, 9-10, 11.
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claiming wrongful honor by the issuer. 83  The confines of legal
remedies, but not equitable remedies, are fairly well established.
The customer may recover damages for wrongful honor, whether
the issuer's payment is accidental or intentional.84 Accidental
payment may occur when the issuer mistakenly believes that pre-
sented documents conform satisfactorily with the letter of credit's
terms. Intentional honor of non-complying documents may result
from an issuer's desire to foster or improve a commercially profit-
able relationship with the beneficiary that is unrelated to the par-
ticular letter of credit transaction.8 5
Because the contract between the customer and issuer is
independent of the letter of credit arrangement, a customer may
recover damages from the issuer for money wrongfully paid to a
beneficiary.86  Under the theory that he should be made whole
again, the customer might recover an amount equal to the face
value of the letter of credit, plus incidental damages.8 7  The cus-
tomer may also have a claim against the beneficiary for breach of
the underlying contract.
The UCC, however, does not clearly define the circumstances
in which a customer can obtain equitable relief against the issuer's
83 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 742. An issuer generally has the duty of
examining the presented documents "with care so as to ascertain that on their face they
appear to comply with the terms of the credit." U.C.C. § 5-109(2). The lack of explicit
provisions governing wrongful honor cases contrasts with the Code's express provisions
dealing with the beneficiary's rights against the issuer for wrongful dishonor. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 5-115(1). Commentators have suggested that Article Five's "remarkable" silence
about customers' remedies for wrongful honor is in part due to the fact that "lawyers for
issuers greatly influenced the drafting" of the Article's provisions. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 3, at 741 (citing Schlesinger, Critique of Article V, 3 N.Y. STATE LAW REvIsION
COMM'N, 1955 REPORT 1571, 1630 (1955)).
84 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMsERS, supra note 3, at 728 (indicating that an issuer's honor
may be "inadvertent but wrongful").
85 If the issuer pays upon the presentation of documents that are clearly non-
conforming, the customer may be entitled to injunctive relief under U.C.C. § 5-114. See
notes 89-96 and accompanying text infra.
88 Such relief does not interfere with the obligations established by the letter of credit
relationship itself; it is consistent with the policy of construing ambiguous terms included
in the letter of credit against the drafter (usually the issuer) and requiring the issuer to
exercise good faith to ascertain the compliance vel non of presented documents. See U.C.C.
§ 5-109(1).
87 However, "unless otherwise agreed," the issuer cannot be held liable "for any act or
omission of any person other than itself or its own branch or for loss or destruction of a
draft, demand or document in transit or in the possession of others." U.C.C. § 5-109(l)(b).
Although responsible for "any general banking usage," issuers are not subject to liability
"based on knowledge or lack of knowledge of any usage of any particular trade." U.C.C.
§ 5-109(l)(c). The contract with the customer generally defines the extent of the issuer's
obligations. See U.C.C. § 5-109, Comment 1.
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wrongful honor. The Code provides for injunctive relief in cer-
tain circumstances when fraud is present,8 8 but fails to define
"fraud" adequately. Similarly, the statute does not indicate whether
a court can enjoin an issuer's wrongful honor in the absence of
fraud.
A. Injunctions in the Presence of Fraud
Section 5-114(2) of the UCC gives issuers the option to honor
presented documents that comply with the terms of the letter of
credit, despite notification from the customer that the documents
are "forged" or "fraudulent" or that there is "fraud in the trans-
action."8' A court in its discretion, however, may enjoin such
honor.90
The Code's failure to define "fraud," has prompted varying
judicial responses. Some courts have required a showing of sci-
enter as a condition for finding fraud."1 Others state that intent
is not necessary, and contend that courts can exercise broad dis-
cretion in applying equitable principles."2  Article Five's general
policy of liberal construction, : 3 combined with the absence of
specific guidelines for finding fraud, :4 leaves courts free to apply
a broad definition.95
88 U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b).
89 U.C.C. § 5-114(2); See "note 100 infra. Unless the parties have stipulated otherwise,
the issuer has an absblute duty to honor complying documents despite notification of
"forgery," "fraud" or "fraud in the transaction," if the presenting party is a "holder in due
course" (U.C.C. § 3-302), "a person to whom a document of title has been duly negotiated
(U.C.C. § 7-502), or a "bona fide purchaser of a certificated security". U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a).
In "all other cases," the issuer exercising his option to honor or dishonor must make his
choice "in good faith" (defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(19)). U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b).
90 U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b).
9I This comports with the common-law definition. In West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v.
Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (W.D. Pa. 1976), the court noted the ambiguity of U.C.C.
§ 5-114 and concluded "intentional misrepresentation" is a necessary element of fraud.
92 The New York Court of Appeals, in United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting
Goods, 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 360 N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1976), inter-
preted the Code's failure to define fraud as an implicit rejection of a dogmatic approach
and applied a flexible standard instead.
83 See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
94 Mechanical application of the common law fraud definition (see note 96 and accom-
panying text supra) is inappropriate because it fails to take into account the unique inde-
pendence and documentary nature of the letter of credit relationship.
83 From the "disparate case law" one commentator disterns that to find fraud that
warrants issuance of an injunction, "some degree of intent" must be present, and that mere
default in the underlying contract is insufficient. Note, Letters of Credit: Injunction As A
Remedy For Fraud in U.C.C. Section 5-114, 63 MINN. L. REV. 487, 500 (1'979). "[Bjreach
shades into fraud," he concludes, "in the 'narrowly limited' situation where 'the legitimate
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Many kinds of beneficiary misconduct, therefore, can give
rise to inferences of fraud. This may encourage the issuer and
customer who is unwilling to pay the beneficiary to look beyond
the documents presented for evidence that will support an allega-
tion of fraud. Such a fluid exception to the documentary nature
and commercial independence of the letter of credit relationship
can impair the reliability of the transaction from the beneficiary's
point of view. Moreover, different standards in different juris-
dictions can increase a beneficiary's uncertainty, particularly when
the customer and beneficiary transact business from distant, un-
familiar locales. :)6
By allowing injunctions against honor when the beneficiary
has acted fraudulently, section 5-114(2) appropriately affords cus-
tomers protection from irreparable harm. However, the Code's
failure to carefully circumscribe the contours of fraud has created
a loophole that may undermine the fundamental purposes of let-
ters of credit. Unbridled judicial discretion to find fraud threatens
the letter of credit transaction's documentary nature and inde-
pendence from the underlying transaction. This detracts from the
letter of credit's assurances of reliability and predictability. It is
unrealistic to expect courts to eschew equitable principles in the
absence of legislative restrictions.
B. Equitable Remedies in the Absence of Fraud
The UCC does not define a court's power to enjoin an issuer
from wrongful honor when fraud does not taint the documents or
the underlying transaction).7  Article Five does not expressly be-
purposes of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be served.'" Id.
(citing Intraworld Indus. Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 336 A.2d 316 (1975)). In
an effort to establish the vital element of certainty in this area, he proposes structural
modifications of § 5-114. Id. at 513-16. By looking beyond the documents presented to find
fraud, courts can presently ignore the basic independence and documentary nature of the
letter of credit agreement and apply equity principles to achieve fairness in particular
cases.
96 The issuer, selected by the customer, is usually located closer to the customer than
the beneficiary. Because various risks associated with commercial sales may result from the
great geographical distance between seller-beneficiary and buyer-customer, the issuer and
the beneficiary rarely have prior contact with each other, or familiarity with the juris-
dictional rules of each other's courts, especially in international transactions.
97 See note 83 supra. Various provisions in Article Five incorporate the Code's general
requirement of "good faith" (U.C.C. § 1-201(19)). Section 5-109(l), for example, provides
that "[a]n issuer's obligation to its customer includes good faith and observance of any
general banking usage.... This and similar provisions, however, do not clarify whether or
not a customer can obtain equitable remedies against an issuer for the wrongful honor of
noncomplying documents when the issuer is exercising good faith and "fraud" is not pres-
ent.
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stow injunctive powers upon the courts, except in the instance of
fraud under section 5-114(2). Section 5-114(2), however, has
opened the door to equitable relief and some courts have granted
equitable remedies in situations where fraud is not present.98
The silence of the Code and other statutes allows the courts
to apply equitable principles to prevent possible unjust enrich-
ment of the beneficiary." '  This may diminish the reliability of
letters of credit, particularly for a beneficiary who must worry
about misconduct on the part of the issuer from whom he expects
payment.100 One court recently issued an injunction prohibiting
future installment payments by an issuer, basing its decision on a
finding of issuer misconduct. 10 1 Another court granted a pre-
liminary injunction enjoining an issuer from making payments
without notifying the customer of receipt of the demand and giv-
ing the customer ten days to show evidence of fraud or non-
conformity of the presented documents.10 2 One court even en-
98 See notes 101-03 and accompanying text infra.
99 See, e.g., Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. Bank Melli Iran, 467 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Note, supra note 95, at 490; note 102 infra.
100 In an installment letter of credit arrangement, the beneficiary may not be aware that
the issuer, whom he did not select and often does not know, is wrongfully honoring his
drafts and demands for payment. The issuer, for example, may honor complying docu-
ments, despite notification by the customer of fraud in the transaction, unless the customer
convinces a court to enjoin such honor. See U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b); notes 89-90 and accom-
panying text supra. If the issuer neglects to request correction of noncomplying documents,
and the customer obtains an injunction preventing future payments without showing
"fraud," "forgery," or "fraud in the transaction," (required for relief under U.C.C.
§ 5-114(2)(b)), the beneficiary may find his payments terminated unexpectedly, without any
intentional misconduct on his part. Meanwhile, the customer, who enjoyed the advantage
of choosing the issuer, would escape accountability for the issuer's mistakes. Such risk-
shifting from customer to beneficiary contravenes the primary purpose of the letter of
credit arrangement: to lessen the risks that the seller-beneficiary incurs in transacting busi-
ness with the buyer-customer and, by substituting the credit of the issuer for that of the
customer, to assure the beneficiary of payment. The absence of UCC limitations on the
issuance of injunctions outside of § 5-114 leaves courts free to apply equitable remedies
that, over time, may upset the balance of risks sought in letter of credit transactions.
0I Interco, Inc. v. Schwartz, 20 U.C.C. REP. 716 (D. Mass. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
560 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1977). In Interco, the issuing bank had paid installments to the
beneficiary upon demand, even though the latter failed to present conforming documents.
The bank communicated its intention to continue such payments. The plaintiff-customer
alleged, but did not prove, fraud. The court, however, found that because there was no
certainty of an adequate remedy at law the customer-plaintiff would suffer "irreparable
harm" if an injunction did not issue. Because of the UCC's silence on the issue, the court
relied on these equitable principles to grant an injunction. Id. at 721. The court cited the
UCC scope provision's "cannon of liberal interpretation" to support its exercise of discre-
tion. Id. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
102 Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. Bank Melli Iran, 467 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In
this case, the political turmoil in Iran created the possibility that the new government,
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joined the beneficiary from making demands for payment.1 0 3
The cases have failed to establish any universal, mandatory
facts that a complaining customer must show to obtain relief.
1 4
The lack of standards governing the availability of equitable relief
introduces harmful uncertainty into letter of credit relation-
ships.105 Again, legislative guidance establishing the contours of
equitable relief is necessary to preserve the advantages of the let-
ter of credit.
CONCLUSION
Broad judicial discretion has introduced uncertainty into im-
portant areas of letter of credit law. Insufficient statutory guid-
which had assumed the role of beneficiary to outstanding guaranty credits, would demand
payment from the issuing bank although the underlying contract had been substantially
performed. The letters of credit in Stromberg Carlson were secured in connection with bank
guaranties that guaranteed the customer-plaintiff's performance of the contract as well as
repayment of the advances it received should it fail to perform. (For a discussion of
standby letters of credit and performance guaranties, see note 57 supra.) The court granted
the customer-plaintiff a preliminary injunction against the issuer's payment. In allowing the
equitable remedy, the court read into the letter of credit a "notice" provision, requiring the
issuer to give the customer notice of demands for payment and an opportunity to show
fraud sufficient to justify issuance of a permanent injunction against wrongful payments.
Id. at 532. The mere possibility of fraud provided the grounds for equitable relief. For an
extensive discussion of the letter of credit litigation spawned by the chaos in revolutionary
Iran, see Note, "Fraud in The Transaction": Enjoining Letters of Credit During the Iranian Rev-
olution, 93 HARv. L. REv. 992 (1980).
03 Steinmeyer v. Warmer Consol. Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 515, 116 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1974)
(discussed in Note, supra note 5, at 850 n.165).
104 See, e.g., notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
105 Extending the availability of injunctive relief for customers claiming wrongful honor
may adversely affect letter of credit arrangements. Willful misconduct by an issuer result-
ing in wrongful honor rarely occurs without collusion or at least tacit awareness on the part
of the beneficiary. On the other hand, issuer misconduct that is merely negligent is likely
to occur without the beneficiary's involvement. If a customer claiming wrongful honor can
obtain an injunction against future payments by showing mere negligence, the issuer and
beneficiary may assume that they can rely upon the customer himself to exercise initiative
in policing the transaction. Thus, rather than becoming more scrupulous, the issuer and
beneficiary may relax their diligence in adhering to "strict compliance" of the documents,
thus leaving the burden of exacting strict documentary compliance upon the customer.
Usually, the issuer exercises care in making payments to preserve his opportunity to
recover later from the customer in an action for reimbursement. The beneficiary is usually
careful to present documents properly because he anticipates that a court will hold him to
a strict compliance standard. If injunctive remedies become too readily available, the ab-
sence of a protest from the customer at the time of payment will tend to encourage le-
niency on the part of an issuer examining documents and may allow the issuer to invoke
the defense of estoppel against a later action by the customer for wrongful honor. The
customer's responsibility to oversee the letter of credit transaction would most likely give
rise to a concomitant duty to mitigate any reasonably foreseeable damages of wrongful
honor. Responsibility that currently rests with the issuer would in effect shift to the cus-
tomer, which may damage the application of, and adherence to, the "strict compliance"
standard, judicial enforcement of "strict compliance" would necessarily become more com-
plicated and subjective. See notes 44-53 and accompanying text supra.
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ance allows courts to exercise an inappropriate policymaking
function. Article Five of the UCC is broad enough to permit
courts to inject subjectivity into application of the strict com-
pliance standard 106 and manipulate the tenuous definitional dis-
tinction between a standby credit and a guaranty. 10 7  The Code
permits equitable remedies in cases of fraud, but fails to establish
guidelines for ascertaining its presence. 10 8 Code silence about
equitable remedies in other areas allows courts to apply equitable
principles without restriction."'0  Consequently, courts are com-
promising the documentary nature and independence of the let-
ter of credit relationship, and thus impairing the letter of credit's
virtues-reliability, convenience, simplicity and flexibility.
Dilution of letter of credit doctrines has thus far not stirred
widespread commercial distrust of the device." 0  Nevertheless,
despite its desirable flexibility, the letter of credit remains "an in-
strument whose usefulness is directly proportional to its cer-
tainty." "' The trend towards extraordinarily diverse uses might
foreshadow continued deviation from strict objectivity and in-
creased judicial reliance on equitable principles. Ironically, the
judicial autonomy that has traditionally been instrumental in pre-
serving letter of credit principles is now threatening to erode
those same principles.
Legislatures should reevaluate the broad judicial discretion
exercised in the development of letter of credit law. Only legisla-
tive action can diminish or eliminate ambiguities in the UCC and
place appropriate limits upon judicial discretion. In particular, the
definitional problems of standby credits and the usefulness of the
no-guaranty rule demand reconsideration. The legislatures, not
the courts, should decide whether to permit subjectivity in evaluat-
ing documentary compliance," 2 and whether various applications
of injunctive relief are proper." 3 Only with reinforced legislative
guidance can the courts promote the utility of the letter of credit.
Steven T. Kolyer
Io See notes 40-53 and accompanying text supra.
107 See notes 57-59, 66-73, and accompanying text supra.
108 See notes 89-96 and accompanying text supra.
109 See notes 99-105 and accompanying text supra.
110 See notes 9-10 supra.
" B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, at 603.
112 Occasional deviations from strict objectivity, which protects the independence and
documentary nature of the letter of credit agreement, may be appropriate. Because fun-
damental letter of credit principles are at stake, however, the legislatures, not the courts,
should establish the guiding policies. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
11 Legislative initiative in policymaking would not only enhance fairness, consistency
and predictability, but would better serve the doctrine of separation of powers.
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